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Abstract
Introduction: In order to monitor the effectiveness of HPV vaccination in Canada the linkage of multiple data registries may
be required. These registries may not always be managed by the same organization and, furthermore, privacy legislation or
practices may restrict any data linkages of records that can actually be done among registries. The objective of this study
was to develop a secure protocol for linking data from different registries and to allow on-going monitoring of HPV vaccine
effectiveness.
Methods: A secure linking protocol, using commutative hash functions and secure multi-party computation techniques was
developed. This protocol allows for the exact matching of records among registries and the computation of statistics on the
linked data while meeting five practical requirements to ensure patient confidentiality and privacy. The statistics considered
were: odds ratio and its confidence interval, chi-square test, and relative risk and its confidence interval. Additional statistics
on contingency tables, such as other measures of association, can be added using the same principles presented. The
computation time performance of this protocol was evaluated.
Results: The protocol has acceptable computation time and scales linearly with the size of the data set and the size of the
contingency table. The worse case computation time for up to 100,000 patients returned by each query and a 16 cell
contingency table is less than 4 hours for basic statistics, and the best case is under 3 hours.
Discussion: A computationally practical protocol for the secure linking of data from multiple registries has been
demonstrated in the context of HPV vaccine initiative impact assessment. The basic protocol can be generalized to the
surveillance of other conditions, diseases, or vaccination programs.
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Introduction
The human papillomavirus (HPV) is one of the most prevalent
sexually transmitted viral infections in the world [1]. Persistent
infection with oncogenic high-risk HPV types, in particular 16
and/or 18, accounts for the majority of cervical cancer and is
associated with oral, vulvar, vaginal, penile and anal intraepithelial
neoplasia and cancer [2]. HPV is also the cause of external genital
warts, with over 90% attributable to low-risk HPV types 6 and 11
[2]. HIV co-infected individuals are at greater risk of developing
rarer and/or more aggressive forms of cancer such as anal and
penile carcinoma as well as genital warts [2].
Since 2007 an effective preventive quadrivalent vaccine has
been available in Canada that protects against low risk (non-
oncogenic) types 6 and 11, and high risk (oncogenic) types 16 and
18; in 2010 a bivalent second vaccine against types 16 and 18 was
approved for use. Currently, publicly funded school-based HPV
immunization programs have been implemented for girls in all 13
Canadian jurisdictions. However, program details, such as school
grade(s) in which the vaccine is offered and whether or not there is
a catch-up program, vary by province/territory. While the vaccine
has the potential to substantially reduce costs associated with
screening and treatment and to reduce the overall HPV-related
disease morbidity/mortality burden, the long-term and popula-
tion-level effectiveness of this vaccine are not known. HPV
surveillance and research are necessary in order to understand the
vaccine’s impact on population health and to inform policy
decisions concerning the allocation of health care resources.
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nants of HPV types, variation by geographic location and risk
behaviour is not available for all regions in Canada. Noting that
vaccine impact on cancer incidence will not be measurable in a
vaccinated population for another generation, we need to monitor
HPV type distribution, changes in sexual behaviour, and
associations with cytological abnormalities (including pre-cancer-
ous lesions), as well as anogenital warts in the short term.
One of the proposed mechanisms to address the short- and
long-term objectives to assess the impact of the HPV vaccine
introduction is via the linkage of population-based databases
(registries) on cancer, cervical screening, health care services, and
immunization. Certain jurisdictions, for example, Manitoba, have
robust population-based registries; others are in the early stages of
developing such systems. Regardless of the maturity of such
registry-based systems, data linkages between registries can only be
conducted in an environment that is responsive to patient privacy
concerns.
Statutes in Canadian jurisdictions permit the reporting of
personal health information (PHI) [3] for public health purposes
without patient consent. Similarly, the US Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule permits
the disclosure of PHI to a public health authority without patient
authorization [4–10]. However, in general, the public is more
comfortable with their health information being used for
secondary purposes if it is de-identified at the earliest opportunity
[11–18] and in practice providers and data custodians have been
reluctant to disclose identifiable patient information to public
health even when permitted by legislation [19–22]. Such
reluctance can be overcome if patient consent to disclose the data
for public health purposes is sought. However, there is compelling
evidence that requiring explicit consent can bias data sets because
consenters and non-consenters differ on important demographic
and socio-economic characteristics [23–25].
In this paper we present a protocol for the secure linking and
surveillance of patient records in different registries where the
sharing of identifying patient information is not possible, either
because the registries are not set up to allow for such linkages or
because the custodians of the registries are not authorized to link
data between them due to patient privacy concerns. The proposed
protocol will allow a public health unit (PHU) to compute relevant
statistics from linked data on an on-going basis while providing
strong patient privacy guarantees.
Methods
Motivating Example
While linking data registries when identifiable information
about the patients cannot be shared is a general problem, we
consider it within the context of an HPV surveillance example to
motivate and illustrate our solution. We assume that there are two
registries. One registry contains demographic information about
the population, and the second registry contains the results of
HPV-associated tests. For example, the former can be a large
practice, a hospital, or a vital statistics registry. The latter can be at
private or public laboratories at the local or provincial level.
As an example, should the PHU wish to investigate the
relationship between HPV test results and ethnicity, the relation-
ship can be expressed as a chi-square test, an odds ratio test, or a
relative risk. If HPV test results are captured in one registry and
ethnicity in another (as is typically the case), any analyses require
that the records in the two registries be linked. Table 1 shows the
contingency table that we need to construct to investigate the
association between ethnicity and the results of an HPV test. The
cells of the table are the counts of patients. We refer to the two
registries as R1 (with HPV screening data) and R2 (with ethnicity
data).This example can be extended to multiple dimensions
without loss of generality, but we will use this simple 262 example
to discuss previous work in this area and to illustrate our secure
linking protocol.
The two registries will not contain exactly the same patients, but
there is expected to be an overlap between them. This means that
not all patients in R1 will have records in R2 and vice versa.
The two registries hold one or more common linking fields on
all of their patients. We assume that these linking fields are direct
identifiers, such as a health insurance card number and/or a social
insurance number. In practice, multiple fields can be concatenated
or encoded to create a single identifier used for linking. Also, note
that these direct identifiers do not need to be numeric but can be
strings, dates or categorical values. For example, in a Canadian
context the date of birth, postal code, and gender uniquely identify
approximately 99% of adults living in urban area [26], making
that combination of commonly collected demographic information
suitable for linking purposes.
For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we will refer to a
single linking field in Table 1. By comparing the two registries on
the linking field it would be possible to match their records with
certainty. Because the linking field is a direct identifier, it can be
used to determine the identity of the patients, and would therefore
be considered personally identifying information.
Requirements for a Secure Linking Protocol
Based on the practical realities of privacy problems experienced
by an actual PHU, we have formulated five requirements for a
protocol to link the data in the two registries. We will examine
each of these requirements in turn to illustrate the strengths and
weaknesses of the various approaches that have been proposed:
N A1. The PHU cannot collect personal health informa-
tion from the registries. The registries cannot disclose
identifiable health information to the PHU because of
legislative constraints or because they have reservations about
privacy.
N A2. The protocol must not use a trusted third party
(TTP). A TTP would be an entity independent of the
registries and the PHU, but would be able to access identifiable
information about the patients. While it is possible to use a
TTP to link the data from the two registries, there are
pragmatic challenges to consider. First, the custodians of both
registries need to be able to share the data with the TTP, and
this may be challenging if the registries are within different
organizations or jurisdictions, and each wants the TTP to be
‘housed’ within their organization or jurisdiction. For example,
if the source registries are in different jurisdictions but cover
the same patient population (e.g., provincial and federal) they
may not agree on who the TTP should be. Second, the
Table 1. Example of a contingency table for which we want
to compute a bivariate relationship.
Any HPV (R1)
2ve +ve
Ethnicity (R2) Aboriginal n11 n12
White n21 n22
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039915.t001
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information to a third party without patient consent, even if it
is for the purpose of linking information and the data remain
within the jurisdiction.
N A3. The two registries must not have to trust each
other. It must not be necessary for the registries linking their
data to trust each other. This lack of trust may be driven by
security or legal concerns. For example, trust is necessary if the
two registries need to share a secret key, in which case each
registry must trust the other one will protect the key since a key
compromise would endanger the information held by both
registries. Furthermore, the registries may not have the
authority to share identifiable patient data amongst themselves
without patient consent. For example, the two registries may
be within two different government departments and there is
no legal basis for sharing data between them.
N A4. No new information can be discovered about
patients in any one registry due to the linking
exercise. Any matching protocol must not allow a registry
to discover new information about its patients that is gained
from the linking with the other registry. It is often the case that
a registry is not able to collect new information without
consent or additional authorization. This is a common
requirement in the privacy-preserving computation literature
where parties collaborating in a computation must not learn
something new due to their participation [27,28].
N A5. A security compromise at the site of any party
involved in the protocol must not reveal the identity
and any sensitive information of any patients. In
addition to the registries that are the data sources for linking,
other parties involved in the secure linking protocol should not
hold any PHI. This will ensure that if the security of these
other parties is compromised that no PHI will be disclosed.
The above requirements have been implicitly acknowledged in
the literature in that different protocols have been developed to
address subsets of them. In the following review we examine how
well these requirements have been met.
Data Linking Architectures and Protocols
Current data linking protocols can be classified into one of the
five architectures shown in Figure 1. The simplest architecture is
(a), where both registries provide their raw data to the PHU, which
then performs the linking. This means that the registries provide
the PHU with the linking fields, ethnicity, and the HPV results.
This protocol does not meet requirements A1 and A5. For A1, the
PHU would get identifiable patient information, and for A5 a
security compromise at the PHU would reveal the identity and
sensitive information of the patients.
Under architecture (b) in Figure 1, R1 can give the linking fields
for all of its patients to R2 to link with its own data. R2 links the
data and generates new unique keys for all of the records, which it
sends back to R1. Then both registries send their ethnicity and
HPV data with the unique keys separately to the PHU, which can
re-link the data and create the contingency table in Table 1.
However, with this protocol, a registry may discover new
information about its patients. For example, R2 may discover
which one of its patients has been tested for HPV. This would fail
on requirement A4. While the fact of being tested for HPV may
not seem like a major breach if testing is common, consider
situations where a registry only holds information about those
receiving treatment for drug addiction and substance abuse, or
individuals who receive social assistance. In such a case knowing
that an individual exists in a particular registry could reveal highly
sensitive information. Furthermore, this approach does not meet
requirement A3. Finally, the PHU could potentially re-identify
individuals because when the data is cross-tabulated as in Table 1
there may be small cells in the contingency table. Small cells can
allow an adversary to re-identify patients. We examine this
situation in more detail below.
Consider Table 2, which covers a known population. The
Aboriginal individual who was not HPV positive will know that all
of the other Aboriginal individuals in the data set tested positive.
In this case an individual in the data can reveal information about
all other individuals in the data. Table 3 would allow an external
user to know that all Aboriginal individuals in the data set tested
positive.
If the data in Table 2 and Table 3 does not represent the whole
or a known population, there is still a risk of re-identifying
Figure 1. Different architectures in the literature for linking
two registries.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039915.g001
Table 2. Example of a contingency table for which there is a
high identity disclosure risk within the population.
Any HPV
2ve +ve
Ethnicity Aboriginal 1 11
White 50 15
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039915.t002
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sample. For Table 2, if one can estimate that there was only a
single individual in the cell ‘Aboriginal and Negative’ in the whole
population (i.e., can estimate that the sample ‘unique’ is also a
population ‘unique’), then the same re-identification risk as for
small cells exists. Similarly, for Table 3, if one can determine that
there were indeed only five positive Aboriginals in the population
then the same re-identification risk exists as for small cells. It is
possible to estimate the cell size for the population using sample
data [29].
One possible solution is to develop a protocol to suppress the
small cells in the contingency table before it is disclosed to the
PHU. However, it would not be possible to compute associations
on tables with suppressed cells. In addition, by executing
additional queries on the data it would be possible to reconstruct
the suppressed cells. For example, consider Table 4 which had a
small cell suppressed. Now the PHU can execute another query
shown in Table 5 that does not have small cells on the same data
(assuming a minimal cell size of 5). Because the marginal totals for
the ethnicity in the two tables are expected to be the same, it
would be possible determine that the value of the suppressed cell in
Table 4 was 1. As another example, consider Table 6 which had a
small cell suppressed. Another query, shown in Table 7, with
gender instead of ethnicity does not have small cells and reveals
the marginal totals for the HPV results, which then reveals that the
suppressed cell in Table 6 is of size zero. More generally, iterative
algorithms can be used to determine the exact value or a narrow
value range for suppressed cells if the marginal totals are known
[30].
Therefore, as long as multiple tables can be generated it cannot
be guaranteed that cell suppression would work. This is a known
inference problem in statistical databases [31].
Secure protocols following architecture (b) have been proposed
[27,32–38]. These require collaboration among the registries and
at the end of their joint computations the contingency table would
be shared with the PHU by one or both of the registries. However,
they would all be prone to the small cells problem noted above,
and the two registries would still need to trust each other since in
many of these protocols one of the registries would end up with the
contingency table (requirement A3). In addition, some protocols
will only work with three or more registries [34,38], and would
therefore not be applicable in the simplest case of two registries.
A slight modification is architecture (c) where the PHU actively
participates in the matching and the computations needed rather
than being just a recipient of data. One approach is for the two
registries to agree on a secret random value and concatenate it to
the linking variables, and then hash this concatenated value. The
hashed values are then sent to the PHU from each registry [39,40].
The PHU would match the hashed values from the two registries,
count the number of matching hashes, and compute the cell values
in the contingency table of Table 1. A number of other
cryptographic protocols have been developed that are suitable
for this architecture [41–45]. These protocols also do not meet the
same requirements as the ones following architecture (b) in that
they can reveal identifying information to the PHU through small
cells and require both registries to trust each other.
Some protocols use a TTP to participate in the linking instead
of providing the data to the PHU as illustrated in architecture (d).
The TTP would not obtain the contingency table. Instead, the
contingency table would be computed from one or both registries
and this information would be transmitted to the PHU. One
protocol requires the registries to send hashed values to the TTP
who then performs the linking [46]. However, this is prone to a
dictionary attack, which is when an adversary tries all possible
input values until one hashes to the same value. More secure
protocols have been proposed [47,48], but these have the same
disadvantages as those following architecture (c), as well as
requiring a TTP and being vulnerable to collusion between the
TTP and one of the registries. Furthermore, if a TTP’s security is
compromised then this would result in a significant breach
affecting both registries.
The final architecture illustrated in panel (e) also requires a
TTP. In one deployment of this architecture in Wales, the
demographic information is separated from the clinical informa-
tion, and all of the data sources send the demographic information
to a TTP who then performs probabilistic matching of the records
on these variables, generates a new unique identifier for each
record to allow linking, and sends the unique identifier back to the
data sources [49,50]. The data sources then provide the unique
identifier with the clinical information to a databank accessed by
external parties, such as researchers. In our case the databank
Table 3. Example of a contingency table for which there is a
high identity disclosure risk from an external attacker.
Any HPV
2ve +ve
Ethnicity Aboriginal 0 5
White 50 15
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039915.t003
Table 4. Example of contingency table with suppressed cells.
Any HPV
2ve +ve
Ethnicity Aboriginal – 11
White 50 15
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039915.t004
Table 5. Example of contingency table that would reveal the
contents of the suppressed cells in Table 4.
Age
,20 .20
Ethnicity Aboriginal 6 6
White 50 15
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039915.t005
Table 6. Example of contingency table with suppressed cells.
Any HPV
2ve +ve
Ethnicity Aboriginal – 5
White 50 15
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039915.t006
Secure Linking of Registries for HPV Surveillance
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cryptographic techniques utilizes a TTP to run remote sub-queries
at the registries and combine and return results back to the PHU
[51]. One protocol hashes the linking variables, but also requires
that the registries share a secret key [52]. A more secure protocol
that utilizes bloom filters has been proposed, which also requires a
TTP [53]. A stand alone probabilistic linking technique has been
proposed which can be used within this architecture [54]. All of
these protocols would not meet requirement A1 because they are
vulnerable to the small cells problem that could leak personal
information.
Even though various subsets of the requirements have been met
in previous research, there have been no protocols developed that
address all of the requirements, which is the main contribution of
this paper.
Principles and Techniques
As background, we present a set of design elements and building
blocks that we integrated into our final protocol.
Using A Semi-Trusted Third Party
In our proposed protocol we use a semi-trusted third party
(sTTP). This is a commonly used term to describe a party who
would not be able to obtain personal information about the
patients, even if it tried to do so. Therefore, there is no risk that
patient privacy would be breached, making it unnecessary to fully
trust that third party. The only requirement on the sTTP is that
they execute the linking protocol faithfully. The utilization of an
sTTP in a secure linking protocol would allow us to meet all of the
requirements posited earlier. Utilization of an sTTP is a weaker
trust requirement than requiring a trusted-third party, who would
be able to obtain personal information if it wanted to (hence it
needs to be fully trusted). Furthermore, a data breach from an
sTTP would not compromise any PHI.
To ensure that the third-party need only be semi-trusted, we
propose to compute the statistics that are needed by the PHU
directly rather than disclose a contingency table to the PHU. The
statistics we will use are the omnibus chi-square test, the odds ratio
and its confidence interval, and the relative risk and its confidence
interval. The remainder of the paper describes such a protocol
while meeting all of the requirements.
Commutative Hash Function
A hash function transforms an input value A to an output value
B such that the B value is unique to A and it is not possible to
obtain A from B. The input A would typically consist of a message
to be hashed and a key. A commutative hash function HðÞ has the
additional property that:
Hm 1,Hm 2,m3 ðÞ ðÞ ~Hm 2,Hm 1,m3 ðÞ ðÞ ð 1Þ
This means that multiple applications of the hash function in
different order will produce the same results. A detailed discussion
of a commutative hash function based on the discrete log that is
suitable for the problem of matching records from multiple
registries is presented in Appendix S1.
Secure Computation
Privacy-preserving computation protocols often utilize Secure
Multi-party Computation (SMC) [55,56]. SMC computes the final
result in a secure way among multiple parties. Cryptographic and
other tools are often used among two or more parties to jointly and
securely compute one or more functions using their own private
inputs. By using this approach, the final result is the same as that in
the corresponding non-secure algorithm, and thus the main trade-
off is between security and efficiency. SMC methods have been
used previously to define secure disease surveillance protocols [57].
One of the popular encryption techniques used in privacy-
preserving methods is homomorphic encryption. In this type of
cryptosystem, one operation on the plaintexts will be mapped to
another, or even the same, operation on the ciphertexts. For
instance, in Paillier [58] encryption, for any two plaintext messages
m1 and m2 and their encryption Em 1 ðÞ and Em 2 ðÞ , the following
equation is satisfied:
DEm 1 ðÞ |Em 2 ðÞ mod n2   
~m1zm2 mod n ð2Þ
where n is a product of two large prime numbers, and D is the
decryption function. Therefore, in this type of cryptosystem
addition of the plaintexts is mapped to multiplication of the
corresponding encrypted values. The Paillier cryptosystem also
allows a limited form of the product of an encrypted value:
DEm 1 ðÞ
m2 modn2   
~m1|m2 mod n ð3Þ
which allows an encrypted value to be multiplied with a plaintext
value to obtain their product.
Another property of Paillier encryption is that it is probabilistic.
This means that it uses randomness in its encryption algorithm so
that when encrypting the same message several times it will, in
general, yield different ciphertexts. This property is important to
ensure that an adversary holding a public key would not be able to
compare an encrypted message to all possible encrypted counts
from zero onwards and determine what the original plaintext
value is.
In our protocol we use two sub-protocols based on the Paillier
cryptosystem that to perform the intermediate calculations [59]:
secure two-party addition and secure two-party multiplication.
Secure two-party addition allows any two parties to jointly add
two integers together without either party revealing the value of
the individual integer to the other, and without sharing the sum.
Each party ends with a partial result (private output values). The
two parties, P1 and P2, each has her own private integer value, a1
and a2 respectively. They obtain their own private output values,
b1 and b2, such that:
a1za2~ b1|b2 ðÞ mod n ð4Þ
Secure two-party multiplication allows the two parties to jointly
multiply two integers without revealing the values of these integers
or the resulting product to each other. For two parties, P1 and P2,
they compute their own private output values, b1 and b2, using
their private input values, a1 and a2 such that:
Table 7. Example of contingency table that would reveal the
contents of the suppressed cells in Table 6.
Any HPV
2ve +ve
Gender Male 25 2
Female 25 18
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039915.t007
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The Secure Linking Protocol
There are three actors in our protocol as follows:
Registry. The custodians of the data that need to be linked. In
our example we assume two registries but this can be easily
extended without loss of generality.
Aggregator. The aggregator is a semi-trusted third party who
can securely compute the statistics on the contingency table and
sends the result back to the PHU. We assume there are two
aggregators.
PHU. Defines which data elements are required and receives
the final result of the analysis.
The protocol has three phases: (a) request, (b) matching, and (c)
analysis.
Request Phase
The protocol is initiated each time an analysis needs to be
performed. For example, if the PHU wants to investigate the
relationship between HPV test results and ethnicity, then the
protocol is initiated. The completion of the protocol results in the
production of the desired statistical result. In our example we
assume that the PHU wishes to compute the odds ratio on the 262
contingency table. If the PHU then wants to investigate another
relationship using the same two registries or different registries, say
the relationship between HPV vaccination and HPV results, then
the protocol would be initiated again.
The PHU then sends four different queries to the registries, one
for each row and column in the contingency table. Each query has
a unique identifier, Qk, where the value of k indicates the column
or row in the contingency table. For example, the query Q1z is for
the Aboriginal patients. Another query, Qz2 would be for patients
with positive HPV results. This is illustrated in Figure 2. To
compute statistics on a 262 table, four queries would need to be
generated by the PHU with two targeted at each registry.
Upon receiving a query, each registry generates a random
number only known to the registry, denoted by Rk. The random
number is specific to each query.
Matching Phase
Each registry would respond with a value for each patient
matching the query. A registry would select an Aggregator at
random to respond to. Let’s say that the direct identifier (linking
field) for a patient from Registry 1 is denoted by IDi and the
linking field for a patient from Registry 2 is denoted by IDj.
Registry 1 sends the hash value HR 1z,IDi ðÞ to the Aggregator.
In the example in Figure 3, Registry 1 sends this value to
Aggregator 1. Aggregator 1 was chosen randomly by the registry
and Registry 1 may send the value for the next patient to
Aggregator 2. Because this is a hashed value and Aggregator 1
does not know the value of R1z, Aggregator 1 would not be able
to determine the IDi value. Aggregator 1 then forwards that
information to Registry 2, which hashes that value and sends it
back asHR z2,HR 1z,IDi ðÞ ðÞ . Aggregator 1 would then store that
value.
Registry 2 would also respond with a message for every patient
which satisfies the query. In the example of Figure 3, Registry 2
also selects Aggregator 1. By going through the same sequence of
messages Aggregator 1 also gets HR 1z,HR z2,IDj
     
for the
patient from Registry 2. If the same patient exists in both
responses from Registry 1 and Registry 2, then
HR z2,HR 1z,IDi ðÞ ðÞ ~HR 1z,HR z2,IDj
     
and Aggregator
1 would be able to determine that the same patient appeared in
both registries within the cell making up the intersection of the
queries. This is illustrated in Table 8. In this case Aggregator 1
matched two patients, and therefore its matched count would be 2.
Because each Registry selects an Aggregator at random, no
Aggregator will have a total count for a particular cell. This
ensures that neither Aggregator will know with certainty if the cell
has a small count. Therefore, Aggregator 19s count of 2 is not a
complete count of all Aboriginals with positive HPV results. There
are two patients who were not matched by Aggregator 1 and it is
not possible for Aggregator 1 to know whether these two patients
exist in Aggregator 29s table. Aggregator 2 had 3 patients
matched. Therefore, in total we have 5 matched patients.
However, the patient with an ID of 2 would not be matched
because its values are split between the two Aggregators. The
patient with ID number 3 would not be matched because there is
no information on the ethnicity of that individual in Registry 2.
Once both registries have sent all of their hashed values to the
Aggregators, the Aggregators need to reconcile their lists.
Specifically, Registry 1 may have sent its value for a patient to
Aggregator 1 and Registry 2 sent its value for the same patient to
Aggregator 2. Therefore, it is not possible for either Aggregator to
know that the patient exists in that cell. In our example,
reconciliation would reveal that the patient with ID 2 is also
matched.
Figure 2. The public health unit sends a query for a particular cell within the desired contingency table.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039915.g002
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final counts for the cell. Aggregator 1 knows that it already has a set of
S1 matching hashes and Aggregator 2 knows that it has a set of S2
matching hashes. In our example we have S1~ HR z2, ð f
HR 1z,ID1 ðÞ Þ ,HR z2,HR 1z,ID4 ðÞ ðÞ g and S2~ HR z2,HR 1z, ð ð f
ID5ÞÞ,HR z2,HR 1z,ID6 ðÞ ðÞ ,HR z2,HR 1z,ID7 ðÞ ðÞ g . However,
the union of these sets does not give us all of the matching patients.
Define a set of patients from Registry 1 who are not matched in
either Aggregator:
X~ xD Vi : HR z2,HR 1z,IDi ðÞ ðÞ fg \ S1|S2 fg ~1 fg ð 6Þ
and similarly from Registry 2:
Y~ yD Vj : HR 1z,HR z2,IDj
        
\ S1|S2 fg ~1
  
ð7Þ
Consider the notation for the contingency table in Table 9. Let us
assume that we are computing the count n12. This consists of two
counts, one from each of the aggregators, summed together
n1,12zn2,12. Below are the steps for computing n1,12 and n2,12:
1. On all xi|yj pairs, xi[X and yj[Y, the Aggregators run a
secure two-party subtraction. At the end of each secure two-
party subtraction Aggregator 1 will have a value vi computed,
and Aggregator 2 will have a value wj computed such that
xi{yj~vi|wj mod n (see equation (4)). According to the
secure two-party addition protocol, if Aggregator 1 initiates the
protocol and xi~yj, then vi~0. Otherwise if Aggregator 2
initiates the protocol and xi~yj, then wj~0. It does not matter
which Aggregator initiates the protocol, but only one should do
it to ensure that matches are not double counted. If either of vi
is zero or wj is zero, then the two values match.
2. Let c1 be the number of vi’s where vi~0, and let c2 be the
number of wj’s where wj~0.
3. Aggregator 1 computes:
n1,12~DS1Dzc1 ð8Þ
and Aggregator 2 computes:
n2,12~DS2Dzc2 ð9Þ
Note that no single aggregator will know the value of n12 at the
end of this protocol; it can only be computed by combining the
values from both aggregators.
Figure 3. An example showing how a registry responds for a
request for counts. A sequence of messages is generated for each
patient.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039915.g003
Table 8. Example of the matching performed by Aggregator
1 and Aggregator2 based on the hash values that they
receive.
Aggregator 1 Matching Table
Registry 1 Registry 2
HR z2,HR 1z,ID1 ðÞ ðÞHR 1z,HR z2,ID1 ðÞ ðÞ
HR 1z,HR z2,ID2 ðÞ ðÞ
HR z2,HR 1z,ID3 ðÞ ðÞ
HR z2,HR 1z,ID4 ðÞ ðÞHR 1z,HR z2,ID4 ðÞ ðÞ
Aggregator 2 Matching Table
Registry 1 Registry 2
HR z2,HR 1z,ID2 ðÞ ðÞ
HR z2,HR 1z,ID5 ðÞ ðÞHR 1z,HR z2,ID5 ðÞ ðÞ
HR z2,HR 1z,ID6 ðÞ ðÞHR 1z,HR z2,ID6 ðÞ ðÞ
HR z2,HR 1z,ID7 ðÞ ðÞHR 1z,HR z2,ID7 ðÞ ðÞ
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039915.t008
Table 9. Notation for computing statistics.
Any HPV
-ve +ve
Ethnicity Aboriginal n11=n 1,11+n2,11 n12=n 1,12+n2,12
White n21=n 1,21+n2,21 n22=n 1,22+n2,22
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039915.t009
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The Aggregators can now jointly compute the appropriate
statistics. As illustrated in Figure 4, the Aggregators then each send
partial results of their statistical computations to the PHU, which
combines the partial results to obtain the final result.
The count in each cell in the contingency table is split between
the two Aggregators. Suppose we have a 262 contingency table as
in Table 5. Below we go through the steps of calculation for the
odds ratio. The computation of other bivariate statistics, such as
chi-square, relative risk, and the confidence intervals for the odds
ratio and relative risk, are described in Appendix S1.
In Table 9, n1:ij is available to Aggregator 1 and n2,ij is available
to Aggregator 2 for every i and j. We can compute the odds ratio
as follows:
h~
n11n22
n12n21
ð10Þ
which can be defined as:
h~
n1,11zn2,11 ðÞ n1,22zn2,22 ðÞ
n1,12zn2,12 ðÞ n1,21zn2,21 ðÞ
ð11Þ
To separate the above fraction such that each of the two
Aggregators owns her final private values for the odds ratio we will
apply secure two-party addition. In the equations below we will
not show the ‘‘mod n’’ to simplify the presentation. The steps of
the protocol are as follows:
1. Aggregator 1 and Aggregator 2 run secure two-party
additions for their following pairs:
n1,11 and n2,11 such that: n1,11zn2,11~a1,1|a2,1
n1,22 and n2,22 such that: n1,22zn2,22~a1,2|a2,2
n1,12 and n2,12 such that: n1,12zn2,12~a1,3|a2,3
n1,21 and n2,21 such that: n1,21zn2,21~a1,4|a2,4
Therefore, the odds ratio will be converted to:
h~
a1,1|a2,1 ðÞ a1,2|a2,2 ðÞ
a1,3|a2,3 ðÞ a1,4|a2,4 ðÞ
~
a1,1|a1,2 ðÞ
a1,3|a1,4 ðÞ
|
a2,1|a2,2 ðÞ
a2,3|a2,4 ðÞ
2. Aggregator 1 and Aggregator 2 then compute the two
fractions
b1
c1
and
b2
c2
, respectively, such that:
b1~a1,1|a1,2 b2~a2,1|a2,2
c1~a1,3|a1,4 c2~a2,3|a2,4
3. Aggregator 1 and Aggregator 2 send their private values
b1,b2,c1,c2 to the PHU. The PHU then computes h~
b1|b2 ðÞ
c1|c2 ðÞ
.
A summary of the inputs and outputs, including for the statistics
described in more detail in Appendix S1, are provided in Table10.
Empirical Performance Measurement
The challenge with secure computation protocols is that they
are slower than non-secure ones. This makes the assessment of
performance an important determinant of their practicability. We
describe the communication costs in our analysis in Appendix S1.
Here we focus on an empirical assessment of computation time.
The objectives of the evaluation were to determine: (a) the time
to perform the computations under the different conditions, (b)
how the protocol scales as the number of patients returned by the
queries increases, and (c) how the protocol scales as the number of
cells in the contingency table increases.
We assume that all queries return the same number N:: of
patients. Let a be the time it takes to perform a single encryption
or decryption and let t be the time it takes to perform a single
commutative hash. Table 11 shows the total computation time
range (matching and analysis tasks) for each of the statistics based
on the detailed analysis in Appendix S1. Matching within the
Aggregator is not considered as that computation time would be
negligible compared to the computations requiring encryption and
decryption. We consider the general case for the number of cells in
the contingency table, which is denoted by C in Table 10. By
examining Table 11, we would expect that computation time
scales linearly with the number of patients and the number of cells.
To evaluate the computation time performance of the protocol
we empirically determined the values for t and a over 100
iterations for random values of the same integer size. The average
hash time gave us an estimate for t. We then encrypted the hashed
values and the average encryption time gave us a. Using these two
values we could determine the computation time for the
implementation of the protocol. The timing was computed on a
Windows machine running the XP operating system with an Intel
Figure 4. The flow of information between the Aggregators and the PHU.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039915.g004
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size used was 1024 bits.
We assume that m hashed values will be matched within an
aggregator for all cells. In presenting the results, the value of m is
expressed as a percentage of N:: and varied from 0% to 100%,
with the computation time in seconds calculated each time for a
different number of patients. We let the total number of patients
returned by each query requested from the two registries be 5,000,
10,000, 50,000, and 100,000. The value of C indicating the
number of cells was varied from 4 to 16 in increments of 2.
Results
The average time to perform an encryption using the Paillier
cryptosystem is 1.721 ms, and decryption takes 1.882 ms. The
secure multiplication and addition take 2.581 ms on average, and
the average time to hash a value is 3.07 ms. The performance of
the whole protocol was driven by the performance of the matching
phase. The matching phase was driven by the size of the data set
and the number of cells in the contingency table.
Figure 5 illustrates the computation times for different
percentage of matching records within each Aggregator, m$.
The computation time is smallest when m~100% since that’s
when all of the matching can be done within the Aggregator. For a
contingency table with 4 cells and each query returning 100,000
patients, the total computation is just under one hour. With 16
cells it is just under 4 hours.
The graph in Figure 6 shows how the computation time
increases linearly as the number of records returned by a query
increases. The graph in Figure 7 shows how the computation time
increases linearly as the number of cells increases.
The difference between chi-square and odds ratio and relative
risk, and their confidence intervals, is negligible because the total
computation time is driven by the matching phase rather than the
analysis phase. Thus, the computation time for the two latter ones
are almost identical as that for chi-square and are not shown here.
Discussion
Summary
In this paper we have described a secure protocol for linking
records from multiple registries that can be used to monitor the
effectiveness of the HPV vaccine. We have shown that this
protocol is the only one, thus far, that can meet all five
requirements that were derived from actual current constraints
for sharing patient information. The protocol can provide specific
statistics, and is therefore most useful when the statistics to be
computed are known in advance. This fits well with the disease
surveillance context where the same statistics would need to be
computed on an on-going basis.
The performance of this protocol is acceptable even for large
data sets. For example, for a 16 cell contingency table where each
of the queries returns 100,000 patients and none of the matches
can be performed within an Aggregator, the total computation
time is less than 4 hours. This is a worse case assumption, but
nevertheless would still be acceptable performance for a surveil-
lance application since the data set will not change at a faster rate
than 4 hours. It exhibits a linear increase in computation time as
the number of records in the data set grows and as the size of the
contingency table grows.
Details on issues that would need to be addressed during the
deployment of this protocol in practice, such as dealing with small
cells and zero-sized cells, are addressed in Appendix S1.
HIPAA and the Common Rule
While our initial deployment of this protocol was intended for a
Canadian context, its deployment in the US requires special
considerations of current legislation and regulations.
The HIPAA Privacy Rule defines two standards for de-
identifying health information (45 CFR 164.514(b)). The first
one is called the Safe Harbor standard. Under Safe Harbor any
unique identifying number, characteristic, or code must be
Table 11. Summary of the computation time range for each
of the statistics.
Statistic Total Computation Time (max R min)
Chi-square 2t C|N:: ðÞ z2 a|C|N:: ðÞ z20 a|C ðÞ ?
2t C|N:: ðÞ z20 a|C ðÞ
Odds Ratio 2t C|N:: ðÞ z2 a|C|N:: ðÞ z8 a|C ðÞ ?
2t C|N:: ðÞ z8 a|C ðÞ
Relative Risk 2t C|N:: ðÞ z2 a|C|N:: ðÞ z8 a|C ðÞ ?
2t C|N:: ðÞ z8 a|C ðÞ
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039915.t011
Table 10. Summary of the inputs and outputs for the
building block and analysis protocols.
Protocol Inputs Outputs Equation
Two-party
addition
a1,a2 b1,b2 b1|b2
Two-party
multiplication
a1,a2 b1,b2 b1zb2
Odds Ratio n1,11,n2,11 b1,b2 h~
b1|b2
c1|c2
n1,12,n2,12 c1,c2
n1,21,n2,21
n1,22,n2,22
Chi-square n1,11,n2,11 c1,c2 x2~
c1|c2
d1|d2
n1,12,n2,12 d1,d2
n1,21,n2,21
n1,22,n2,22
Relative Risk n1,11,n2,11 b1,b2 r~
b1|b2
c1|c2
n1,12,n2,12 c1,c2
n1,21,n2,21
n1,22,n2,22
Confidence
Interval for
Odds Ratio
n1,11,n2,11 i1,i2
CIln(OR)~ln h ðÞ +z|
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
i1|i2
j1|j2
r
n1,12,n2,12 j1,j2
n1,21,n2,21
n1,22,n2,22
Confidence
Interval for
Relative Risk
n1,11,n2,11 d1,d2
CIln(RR)~ln RR ðÞ +z|
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
d1|d2
g1|g2
s
n1,12,n2,12 g1,g2
n1,21,n2,21
n1,22,n2,22
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039915.t010
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personal health information.
In our protocol we used a hash function to perform the
matching. If a simple hash function was used then it could be
reverse engineered using a dictionary attack. For example, if we
are using an individual’s social security number and that number is
hashed, then an adversary would only need to hash all possible
numbers of the same length and compare it to the targeted value
until a match is found.
A special type of dictionary attack has also been proposed and
utilized to reduce the computation time at the cost of more data
storage capacity – the so-called rainbow tables [60]. In this
method, a table of hash chains is pre-computed for reversing the
hash function by using a reduction function. The chains which
create the items in the rainbow table are chains of one way hash
functions and reduction functions starting at a certain plaintext,
and ending at a certain hashed value. However, only the starting
plaintext and ending hashed value are stored in the rainbow table.
By comparing against only the stored values a significant reduction
in computation can be gained during an attack.
In practice one always adds some randomness to the hash value,
as we do in our commutative hash function. This random value is
called a ‘‘salt’’ or a ‘‘key’’. This makes the range of possible values
that would need to be checked in a dictionary attack, even with a
rainbow table, computationally unattainable in any reasonable
amount of time.
Is a hashed value with a salt considered a uniquely identifying
code under Safe Harbor?
The HIPAA Privacy Rule requires that ‘‘The code or other
means of record identification is not derived from or related to
information about the individual’’ and that the the covered entity
does not use or disclose the code for other purposes or disclose the
mechanism for re-identification (45 CFR 164.514(c)). In our
protocol we can satisfy the second requirement since the random
values used for hashing (the keys) are never shared by the
registries. However, a hash value, with or without a salt, is derived
from identifiable information and would therefore still be
considered personal information under this definition.
The Privacy Rule allows the disclosure of information
containing such coded information as a Limited Data Set (45
CFR 164.514(e)). A Limited Data Set would require a data sharing
agreement with the data recipient, and the data can only be used
for specific purposes: research, public health, or healthcare
operations. For users of our protocol, this means that the purpose
of the linking and analysis would have to be one of the above. For
example, if our protocol is used for public health surveillance or
research and a data use agreement is in place between the
registries and between the registries and Aggregators, then the
requirements for a Limited Data Set would be met.
If our protocol is used for research purposes, then the Common
Rule would also apply. Under the Common Rule, which guides
IRBs, if the user of the information has no means of getting the
key, for example, through an agreement with the other party
prohibiting the sharing of keys under any circumstances or
through organizational policies prohibiting such an exchange,
then this would not be considered human subjects research and
would not require an IRB review [61,62]. In our protocol, if each
of the registries has a policy against the sharing of the salt values
used, then no IRB approval would be required for the linking
project, according to the Common Rule, since the hash values
Figure 5. The average computation times for the chi-square test when the total number of records returned by the queries varies
from the two registries are 5,000, 10,000, 50,000, and 100,000 for a 4 cell and a 16 cell contingency table.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039915.g005
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information.
This inconsistency between HIPAA and the Common Rule is
well documented [63,64].
However, the Privacy Rule does provide a mechanism for an
expert with appropriate statistical knowledge to certify that the
data exchanged has a very small risk of re-identification (45 CFR
164.514(a)), at which point it would not be considered personal
health information [65]. Therefore, should an expert deem that
the (salted) hashed value cannot be reversed and that adequate
legal mechanisms exist prohibiting the exchange of the salt
represent a very small risk of re-identification, then the data
exchanges in our protocol would not be considered identifiable.
In other jurisdictions, such precise prescriptions on the
interpretability of coded information are absent, making it easier
to argue that the exchange of hashed information (with a salt) for
the purpose of matching, with prohibitions on the sharing of that
random value, would not constitute an exchange of personal
health information.
Limitations
Our protocol only allows for deterministic matching of patients
in the two registries. Therefore, the linking field value that is
hashed needs to be a reliable unique identifier across the registries.
We focused on surveillance where the computed statistics are on
a contingency table. Where the variable are continuous and
cannot be meaningfully discretized into categorical variables, the
approach we present will not be suitable.
Future Work
Extensions of our protocol to allow probabilistic linkage would
be expected to result in a higher match rate when there are errors
in the variables making up the linking field. For example, the
inclusion of names in the set of linking fields would be expected to
improve the match rate.
Additional statistics may be added to our protocol to cover more
tests that a PHU may wish to use for evaluation of effectiveness or
other analytical purposes. We consider two examples of more
sophisticated analyses below.
The basic structure of our protocol can also support the
computation of population size estimates using a capture-
recapture (CR) model. A CR model can estimate the total
population of individuals with a particular disease when the
registries have an incomplete listing of that population. A secure
CR protocol would allow the estimation of population size when
the registries are unable to share data. CR models have been used
in the biological sciences to estimate the size of animal populations
[66,67], and in epidemiology to estimate birth and death rates
[68,69], as well as the size of diseased populations [70]. The basic
principle is that animals are caught on multiple occasions and
marked/identified. Using the information on the number of
animals caught/not caught on the multiple occasions, a complete
capture history of animal capture is known. Methods have been
developed to estimate the total population size from such capture
histories. When applied to human populations, the overlap across
multiple disease registries is used to mimic recaptures. The
matching phase of our protocol can compute the number of
overlapping individuals between the two registries. An appropriate
Figure 6. The average computation times for the chi-square test as the proportion of records matching varies for different data set
sizes for contingency tables with 4 and 16 cells.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039915.g006
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size.
Moving beyond surveillance, multivariate models would need to
be constructed to answer questions about whether individuals and
populations can be protected against infection and the cervical/
anal/oral HPV-associated cancers. They can also be used to better
understand HPV vaccine effectiveness through various endpoints
[71–73], including changes in type-specific HPV prevalence,
changes in lesions (via pap test results/colposcopy results), and
over a longer period of time, changes in cervical and other HPV-
related cancer rates. However, all these may be somewhat
impacted by factors such as SES, ethnicity (in the context of
accessing care), age of sexual debut, number of sexual partners,
parity, smoking, and other factors. It would therefore be important
to control for these factors. Future work would need to take our
basic surveillance framework and extend it to allow more general
secure multivariate modeling, such as for general linear models.
Supporting Information
Appendix S1 Description of the commutative hashing
function, the protocols for computing other statistics, as
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